The Critique of Deliberative Discussion. A Response to “Education for Deliberative Democracy: A Typology of Classroom Discussions by Backer, David I
democracy & education, vol 25, no- 1  article response 1
The Critique of Deliberative Discussion
David I. Backer (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)
Abstract
My response to Samuelsson’s (2016) recent essay offers a different paradigm with which to think 
about education, deliberative discussion and democracy. I call this paradigm the critique of deliber-
ative discussion. Following Ruitenberg’s application of Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative democracy 
to education, the critique of deliberative discussion focuses on what Jameson called the “political 
unconscious” of deliberative discussions like those presented by Samuelsson. There is literature that 
critique traditionally moderate- liberal notions of deliberative discussion, which Samuelsson defines 
his typology: reason, willingness to listen, and consensus. While others, like Ruitenberg, have devel-
oped this critique of deliberative- democratic citizenship education, the critique of deliberative dis-
cussion takes a left- of- liberal view of each of Samuelsson’s requirements for deliberative discussion 
listed above and describes practical- pedagogical techniques, which teachers and facilitators can use 
to practice critical discussions. This response’s contribution to the debate is therefore not only to cri-
tique deliberative discussion but also— following Samuelsson— to offer techniques that translate the 
critique into classroom practice.
This article is in response to:
Samuelsson, M. (2016). Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom discussions. 
Democracy & Education, 24(1), Article 5. Retrieved from http://democracyeducationjournal.org/
home/vol24/iss1/5
Samuelsson’s (2016) “Education for Deliberative Democracy: A Typology of Classroom Discussions” is  a neat essay. First, the author mapped out criteria for 
what counts as deliberative democracy in theory, surveying an 
important field of philosophical and political scholarship. Next, 
Samuelsson sculpted three requirements out of this theoretical 
literature, which actual classroom discussions— flesh- and- blood 
people, learning together— might satisfy or not, making their 
discussions more or less deliberative- democratic. These three 
criteria are: (a) the reason- giving requirement wherein different 
points of view are presented, each of which being underpinned 
with reasons that participants put forth; (b) the reflective require-
ment, where participants display a willingness to listen to and 
think about one another’s reasons, as well as revise these reasons if 
new information becomes convincing; and (c) the striving for 
consensus requirement, where participants attempt to formulate 
compromises given existing disagreements, from which a una-
nimity may emerge.
Drawing from observation work in the field, Samuelsson 
(2016) gave concrete examples of discussions that exhibit one or two 
of the requirements, distinguishing these discussions from the most 
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deliberative- democratic discussion, which includes all of them. The 
essay is neat, in the sense that the pieces of the argument fit together 
and achieve the stated goal, all within its stated political paradigm. 
My response in this essay is not to take issue with any given part of 
Samuelsson’s argument per se but to offer another paradigm with 
which to think about education, discussion, and democracy. I call 
this paradigm the critique of deliberative discussion. Following 
Ruitenberg’s (2009, 2010) educational application of Chantal 
Mouffe’s (2000a, 2000b, 2005a) critiques of deliberative democracy 
(and peripherally Dryzek’s [2000] critique), the critique of delibera-
tive discussion paradigm will be more critical than Samuelsson’s.  
By critical, I mean to signal an interest in left- of- liberal thinking 
about language, politics, and education. In a word from Frederic 
Jameson, the critique of deliberative discussion focuses on the 
political unconscious of deliberative discussions like those pre-
sented  
by Samuelsson.
Ruitenberg (2009), for instance, drew from Mouffe’s critique 
of Rawlsian deliberative democratic citizenship to critique 
accounts like Callan’s (1997), calling for an education of political 
adversaries rather than an education for justice as reasonableness. 
Rather than a deliberative model of democratic education, Mouffe’s 
model is agonistic, revolving around the “dimensions of antago-
nism inherent in human relations” (Mouffe 2000b, p.15, Ruitenberg 
2009, p. 2), out of which Ruitenberg crafted a radical political 
education. Elsewhere, Ruitenberg (2009) developed a Mouffian 
response to deliberation that emphasizes affect and fantasy in 
citizenship education, focusing on communication, though she did 
not focus specifically on classroom discussion. (Englund [2012, 
2016] defended deliberative democratic discussion from such 
critiques and is relevant to consider as well— see below.) In general, 
Ruitenberg’s engagement with Mouffe critiqued traditionally 
moderate- liberal notions such as reason, reflection, and consensus 
in democratic educational theory, and I draw from hers as well as 
other agonistic resources such as psychoanalysis, critical race 
theory, and Marxist philosophy of language to critique Samuels-
son’s three criteria for deliberative classroom discussion. While 
Ruitenberg’s work focused on citizenship, this response follows her 
paradigm of critique to engage with Samuelsson’s literature on 
classroom discussion.
At least with respect to Samuelsson’s (2016) three criteria 
(reason, willingness to listen, and consensus), following Ruiten-
berg’s critique of citizenship education, it is similarly necessary to 
articulate critical perspectives on discussion and democracy that 
do not make the same assumptions that Samuelsson’s literature 
makes, drawing as it does from Rawls, Habermas, Guttmann, and 
Thompson. Doing so can also have practical pedagogical out-
comes. In what follows, I aim to sketch a few of the critical theoreti-
cal notions mentioned above, drawing from Ruitenberg, the 
sources mentioned, and matching them with pedagogical tech-
niques when teaching with and for discussion (Parker & Hess, 
2001). The sketch presented here of the critique of deliberative 
discussion is only that, and must be brief. This brief critique of 
deliberative discussion should be read like a blueprint for a larger 
project of critiquing moderate- liberal accounts of discussion 
which aim at democracy through deliberation. To complete the 
blueprint, I take each of Samuelsson’s requirements, describing a 
critical- theoretical perspective on each, including responses to 
such critiques by Englund (2006, 2009, 2012, 2016), and finally 
recommending a pedagogical technique consistent with the 
critique.
Giving Reasons
Deliberative discussion’s emphasis on giving reasons tends not to 
mention emotion, by which I mean feelings, desires, drives, affects, 
and other interior modes/moods that are not conscious, rational, 
or reasonable. People in discussion feel things as well as think 
things, and insofar as democracies include flesh- and- blood people 
rather than minds one- dimensionally wired for giving reasons, it 
behooves us to consider what those emotions are like during 
discussion: namely, what is happening for participants uncon-
sciously when they put forth reasons. Ruitenberg (2009) drew 
from Mouffe’s psychoanalytic influences to critique deliberative 
democracy from this perspective. “As psychoanalysts realized long 
ago,” Ruitenberg wrote, “the suppression of fundamental desires 
and emotions will not make those desires and emotions disappear, 
but only defer their manifestation” (p. 3). From this insight, Mouffe 
worried that repressing desire and emotion can lead to tribalism. 
When it comes to classroom discussion, though, this deferred 
manifestation can directly contradict the supposed democratic 
character of the discussion, but in a different way than Mouffe’s 
worry about tribalism. Theories of discussion like the deliberative- 
democratic model that advocate the suppression of desires (see 
Englund below) can overlook monarchical tendencies in group 
dynamics, no matter how much emphasis teachers place on 
rational deliberation. To see exactly how this works, I would 
consult Freud’s (1975) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. 
Freud claimed throughout his oeuvre, and in this helpful book in 
particular, that people in groups are not merely conscious minds 
pursuing rational interest. They also have an unconscious inner 
lives that inform their behavior. These unconscious lives are driven 
by love, desire, and sexuality. Freud noted some trends in how 
psyches (conscious minds and unconscious inner lives) operate 
when they get together in groups. One thing psyches do is fall in 
love, become attached, and project previous love- loss experiences 
onto others in the world, particularly those with authority. When 
several psyches, like students, do this together with the same 
person, like a teacher in a classroom, the psyches become partially 
hypnotized by the person in charge, which alters the way they 
think and react. Student psyches can tend to treat the teacher like  
a parent figure, desiring the teacher or identifying with them or 
rejecting them. The students then treat one another like siblings 
(see Britzman, 2003). Reason has very little to do with this process 
and, if left unchecked, can quickly create a monarchical classroom 
politics where the teacher is a king- father (Backer, forthcoming).
Giving a reason is never as simple as giving a reason, and 
democracy is different than monarchy. To have democracy in the 
classroom discussion, while taking students’ emotional life into 
consideration, the teacher should redirect students’ emotional 
tendencies toward the classroom demos, or its people rather than a 
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singular leader. In other words, teachers should encourage students 
to talk to one another more than with the teacher themselves. 
Englund (2012) wrote that the critique- from- emotion against 
deliberative democratic classroom discussion is misplaced, 
however. He did recognize that the “role of rational, ideal conversa-
tion might work as an instrument of power for the teacher” (p. 4). 
He cited Bernstein and made a Deweyan move away from tradi-
tional distinctions between reason and emotion, claiming that 
deliberative- democratic classroom discussion should be founded 
on an embodied intelligence.
Yet the Deweyan sidestep is more of a repression than a 
solution. Calling for embodied intelligence and asking us to 
collapse the difference between reason and emotion are insufficient 
responses to Freud’s theory of the unconscious. Ignoring the 
unconscious has more than theoretical consequences: It has 
practical consequences in classroom. Monarchical tendencies in 
classroom discussion have been born out in the research on 
distorted classroom discussion, which the deliberative- democratic 
tradition rarely mentions. If educational discourse analysts from 
1968 until 2003 are to be believed, the majority of allegedly demo-
cratic discussions in United States classrooms may actually be 
monarchical recitations precisely because students focus on 
teachers more than one another (Hoetker & Ahlbrand, 1969; 
Nystrand, Wu, Gamoran, Zesier, & Long, 2001). Emphasizing 
student- to- student interaction to facilitate against their uncon-
scious investment of the teacher with monarchical power is only 
one of a suite of considerations regarding the ways power can 
complicate reason- giving in discussion, but considering the 
unconscious lives of discussion participants as they put forth 
reasons while encouraging reason- giving can help to avoid the 
distortion of discussion into recitation (Backer, 2014).
How can teachers do this, exactly? Harkness pedagogy is a 
helpful resource (Backer, 2015). One technique Harkness teachers 
use to get students focusing on one another rather than only the 
teacher is writing down everything that students say. If a teacher is 
busy writing down student comments, then they cannot make 
suggestive eye contact, respond immediately, or otherwise domi-
nate the discussion and become classroom monarchs. Taking 
copious notes extends wait time, makes the teacher’s attention 
unavailable for emotional and intellectual dependence, and focuses 
the teacher’s attention on students’ own words. Another technique 
is the check- in. At the beginning of a discussion, students should 
somehow (with a partner or to the whole class or to themselves) say 
their names and how they are feeling. Engaging with students’ 
emotions explicitly at the beginning of a discussion can correct the 
sometimes unconscious forces that drive reason- giving during 
discussion, something deliberative discussion tends to leave out of 
the picture (Backer, 2016).
Willingness to Listen
Samuelsson’s (2016) reflective requirement entails a willingness to 
listen to others’ reasons in discussion. But not all students and 
teachers will be willing to listen to one another equally: They may 
be sexist, racist, classist, xenophobic, homophobic, ableist, or 
otherwise discriminatory against one another’s identities. 
Deliberative democracy tends to downplay how racialized, classed, 
and gendered identities prevent harmonious interaction, rarely 
mentioning that it may be difficult for a man to listen to a woman 
putting forth reasons, or difficult for a White person to listen to a 
Black person putting forth reasons, a trans person to a cis person, 
and vice versa. Solnit (2014) has popularized the term mansplaining 
to refer to the way men speak in privileged ways, for instance, and 
conversation analysts have demonstrated the many ways gender 
influences speech habits (Tannen, 1993). Often, advocates of 
deliberative democracy like Englund reduce these critiques to iden-
tity politics. But this is misleading. As Ruitenberg (2010) pointed 
out, “liberalism, in its emphasis on the individual, has underesti-
mated the importance of belonging to collectivities”  
(p. 3). Focusing solely on the individual is a predictable move for 
liberal- deliberative theories. What they call identity is also group 
membership, and people who participate in discussions belong to 
collectivities whose habits, epistemologies, and histories can 
diverge dramatically— even to the point where it is difficult to listen 
to people who belong to different collectivities, particularly 
oppressor collectivities.
Hooks (2003) has described how people from her African 
American and lower- class background did not talk the same way as 
upper- class White students at Stanford University. As a professor, 
she noticed that her students discriminated against certain raced 
and classed forms of talking:
I have found that students from upper- and- middle class backgrounds 
are disturbed if heated exchange take place in the classroom. Many of 
them equate loud talk or interruptions with rude and threatening 
behavior. Yet those of us from working- class [and African- American] 
backgrounds may feel that discussion is deeper and richer if it arouses 
intense responses . . . Few of us are taught to facilitate heated 
discussions that may include useful interruptions and digressions, but 
it is often the professor who is most invested in maintaining order in 
the classroom. (p.148)
Hooks highlighted two sites where identity makes it difficult 
to be willing to listen given the racial and class positions of discus-
sion participants. The first site is the student- student exchange. 
Upper- class students may be “disturbed” by working- class speech 
patterns, equating it with “rude and threatening behavior.” If a 
student feels threatened or offended because of class differences in 
speech, it will be difficult for that person to be willing to listen to 
whatever reasons that speech puts forth. The second site is the 
teacher- student exchange. What a teacher perceives as an interrup-
tion or digression or disruption, for instance, may be a racial or 
classed pattern of speech that is earnestly, in its distinctive style, 
putting forth reasons. If the teacher is not willing to listen to that 
kind of talking, then a willingness to listen fails. In addition to 
commenting on her students as a teacher, hooks also elaborated on 
how her university classroom was not a welcoming place for her to 
express herself when she was a student, and teachers must be 
cognizant of the ways they and their students discriminate against 
certain ways of speaking that are raced, classed, and gendered.
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How to do this? Progressive stack is one discussion tactic 
from Occupy Wall Street that addresses this problem of exclusion 
in communication. Ask participants to raise their hands before 
speaking and then write their names down on a list. This list is the 
“stack.” Participants who identify as belonging to historically 
privileged groups (White, able- bodied, heterosexual, cis- gendered, 
middle- class men) make sure to let others who do not identify with 
such historically privileged groups speak before the former. Rather 
than a universalist approach to deliberation where all are equals, 
using progressive stack takes a reparations approach to delibera-
tion. Students with traditionally marginalized heritages have not 
historically had the opportunities to express and develop their 
thinking in discussions, particularly in higher education contexts. 
The progressive stack redresses this historical imbalance. Of 
course, classrooms are different spaces than social movements like 
Occupy Wall Street. Teachers should use the progressive stack 
alongside clear preparation and scaffolding, including workshop 
activities that set a groundwork for understanding gender and 
racial privilege as it operates in communication. I like to use 
McIntosh’s (1988) “Knapsack of White Privilege,” along with 
practicing I- statements that encourage students to communicate 
both feelings and reasons in reaction to points made during 
discussion.
While liberals like Englund (2012) have claimed that teachers 
should “hesitate in promoting” such “passionate” considerations of 
identity (p. 4), critical educators like hooks know that such 
considerations must be part of pedagogy to counter- interpellate 
the layers of violent injustice enacted by governments and econo-
mies against diverse groups. What is “suitable” for Englund looks 
to critical educators like a call for a politics of respectability in 
classroom discussion.
Consensus
Like reason and willingness to listen, consensus is vulnerable to 
critique from the left as well. Ruitenberg generally has oriented her 
engagement with Mouffe’s critique of deliberative democracy 
around agonism, or the antagonism constitutive of human 
societies. Mouffe’s pluralist politics leads to a radical- democratic 
form of citizenship education, an agonistic approach including 
“those types of conflict that would put into question the basic 
institutions of democracy (Mouffe 2005a, p. 120, in Ruitenberg 
2009, p. 6) and the fundamental ‘ethico- political’ principles of 
liberal democracy” (Mouffe 2005a, p.32, Ruitenberg, p. 6). While 
Ruitenberg has proposed three areas for political education rooted 
in Mouffe’s approach, classroom discussion is not one of them. It 
would be not a stretch of the imagination to infer that consensus- 
seeking deliberative discussion is inconsistent with the agonistic 
approach, or at least the critique of deliberative democracy. To 
develop this inference further and extend Ruitenberg’s proposals 
for a radical- democratic education to classroom discussion, one 
avenue to explore is the way consensus supports what Lyotard 
(1984) called metanarratives.
Habermas’s (1975) writings have contained, as Samuelsson 
(2016) noted, a hallmark theory of consensus- seeking deliberation. 
Lyotard’s (1984) Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge is, 
among other things, a response to Habermas’s argument about 
consensus- seeking speech acts during deliberation in Legitimation 
Crisis. One of postmodernism’s founding texts, Lyotard’s book 
focuses on language games, Wittgenstein’s metaphor for ordinary 
speech. Lyotard reminded us that language games have rules but 
argued that these rules are determined by powerful interests. There 
is a general agonistics in communication, he claimed, a large- scale 
struggle among competing social forces, over which language- 
game rules should be followed in discourse. This general agonistics 
happens in political campaigns, commercials, news media, and 
classrooms as well. Who decides what is a sensible thing to say, for 
instance? Where do the terms of debate, presuppositions, and 
questions come from in classroom discussions? Lyotard has 
claimed these nuts and bolts of discourse— the very words we 
use— derive from metanarratives, big- picture stories, and ways  
of thinking about social life. The metanarratives at work in the 
school’s wider social context tend to set the table for discussion 
(though participants can be creative with what they find on the 
table). For Lyotard, the economic metanarrative of postindustrial 
and financial capitalism decides at least some of the rules of the 
language game we play in classrooms. Maybe these rules can be put 
on the table and examined in the classroom through the right kind 
of discussion. However, consensus- seeking discussions may not be 
that kind of metanarrative- examining discussion. Looking for 
consensus may yield the kind of ideological resonance that leaves 
the general agonistics over language- game rules hidden from view, 
and permits those with power to win the struggle by default. 
Uncritical consensus- seeking can be like forfeiting a competition 
to secure one’s vision of the world.
Englund (2012) chastised such critiques of consensus, 
however, as being unjust. Making reference to Erman (2009), 
Englund claimed that “deliberation [is] constitutive of conflict, i.e. 
starting from different, struggling views,” (p. 4). To Englund, who 
has cited Habermas and Guttman, deliberative discussions are 
constituted by “different views . . . confronted with one another 
[where] arguments for these different views are given time and 
space to be articulated and presented in the classroom” (p. 3). 
While discussants may have differing perspectives, and these 
perspectives can conflict with one another in discussion, Englund 
missed the point of the critiques of consensus. People who 
confront social struggles and participate in discussions are 
different than people whose perspectives confront one another in 
discussion. The latter is an intra- discussive feature: It is an aspect 
of the perspectives at play during any given discussion, namely 
whether these perspectives are in agreement or not. Thinking only 
about the confrontation of different positions during deliberation, 
in a classically liberal way, puts out of sight the material conditions 
of discussants’ existences and the extra- discussive social forces 
that impact (and can be impacted by) their discussion. Conflicting 
views that confront one another during discussion may be a 
certain kind of “struggle,” but it is very different than the ways 
discussants themselves live with class conflict as workers, racial 
struggle as people of color, and gender oppression as women and 
queer folk. Lyotard’s point is that such struggles determine the 
rule of language games that speakers play, which Englund’s 
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response did not address. Rancière’s (1995, 2015) work on dissensus 
is a helpful resource here. Rancière’s idea of democracy casts the 
demos as a disruptive problem for existing social forces. In 
Rancière’s terms, consensus- seeking talk will probably not disrupt 
what is sensible to say. Disrupting existing social forces requires 
dissensus rather than a perpetual attempt to agree. The kind of 
deliberative discussion Samuelsson advocates may fit into this 
nondisruptive category.
How to question metanarratives in classroom discussion? 
The Brazilian philosopher of education Walter O. Kohan practices 
a pedagogical technique called collective questioning that permits a 
disruption of the sensible and does not seek consensus, but rather 
holds questions and tensions during the discussion. At the start of 
a discussion, ask students to go around and offer a question about 
the text or subject matter. It is important to only permit ques-
tions rather than comments or arguments. Next, write these 
questions down so that the group can see them clearly. Then,  
as a group, everyone (teacher included) thinks about connections 
between these questions. Then the teacher may ask, “Which 
question should we start with?” or “Who would like to begin?” 
Haroutunian- Gordon (2014) practices a similar kind of question-
ing for discussions where students interpret literature. This kind of 
collective questioning prioritizes questioning for its own sake, 
tension, and aporia rather than consensus, compromise, or 
decision- making.
Language Is Ideology
In general, the critique of deliberative discussion follows the same 
path as Ruitenberg’s critique of deliberative- democratic citizen-
ship education. Just as Mouffe’s agonistic approach to democracy 
is a critical alternative to Rawls’s and Habermas’s deliberative 
tradition, the critique of deliberative discussion is a critical 
alternative to the deliberative tradition of classroom discussion 
attributed to Guttman, Thompson, and Englund. The critique of 
deliberative discussion takes a different paradigmatic approach to 
language and its relationship to politics. One way to think about 
the critique of deliberative discussion is by placing a new emphasis 
on ideology and language. Rather than thinking of language as a 
mode of communication through which, if practiced in a certain 
way, individuals can make informed decisions about controversial 
issues— that is, as nonideological speech— 
 the critique of deliberative discussion holds that all language is 
ideological. What is said, thought, and heard registers participants’ 
imagined relations to real social conditions, and these imagined 
relations are alive and at work during discussion, rather than 
bracketed. The ideological quality of discussion may be uncon-
scious; it may operate through identity and difference among 
participants; or it may operate in the rules of language games 
established by metanarratives that set the table for discussion. 
Elaborating how language is ideological, the French Marxist 
philosopher Jacques Lecercle (2006) gave the example of “the cat is 
on the mat,” a sentence used in books that teach young children 
about grammar. An example of a sentence that appears not to have 
any political quality, “the cat is on the mat” is actually rich in 
connotations, setting its speaker and listener within an 
institution— i.e. a relationship of places (‘we lay down the rules of 
grammar here [at school]’ . . .) and hence a power relation. It 
imposes on both of them the self- evidence of its transparency 
(which is a symptom of ideology in the traditional pejorative sense 
of the term), starting with the child who must copy it, illustrate it, 
and learn it by heart at school. This sentence clearly illustrates that 
ideology is language and language ideology; it is the product of a 
collective assemblage of enunciation (it does not— and never 
will— have an author); it has served to interpellate generations of 
school kids as speakers. (Lecercle 2006, p. 172)
Even the most apparently apolitical utterances set speakers 
within institutions and power relations just by saying them, like 
between students who unconsciously project monarchical powers 
onto teachers. These allegedly apolitical sentences, particularly in 
classrooms, always imply commands, and impose the kind of 
self- evidence and transparency which accompanies ideology (like 
metanarratives). Whenever students and teachers sit down to 
have a discussion, their sentences are laced with ideological 
meanings, couched in ideological imperatives, and layered with 
ideological histories.
Defending the deliberative discussion from such critiques, 
Englund’s (2012) imperative is for teachers and students to “learn 
‘to live educationally,’ to continuously reconstruct our experiences, 
using the results of that experience to shape subsequent experi-
ences” (p. 8). For Englund, living educationally requires three 
things: first, using “deliberative communication first to create a 
deeper learning [such] that the learners themselves verbalise their 
arguments and their knowing” (p.8); second, creating “a sense of 
community at different levels, both within the classroom and in 
relation to the greater society which the school class is a part of ” 
(p.8); third, developing students’ “judgement ability” in navigating 
the fact/value distinction (p.8). (These come from Englund’s 
comments in response to Ruitenberg. For more on Englund’s 
position itself, see Englund 2006, Englund 2009, and Englund 
2016.) Yet in each case, there is no awareness that language— the 
very stuff of deliberation— is soaked in ideology. Imagined 
relations to real social conditions are embedded in arguments and 
knowing, shapes our understanding of the school’s relationship to 
society, and constructs teachers’ and students’ abilities to judge. 
Deliberation is shot through with ideological meanings that 
present in discussions which deliberative- democratic theories of 
classroom discussion rarely acknowledge. Even the most appar-
ently apolitical utterances come from somewhere— words them-
selves are social entities without single authors— and then go on to 
interpellate speakers and listeners. Deliberative discussions such 
those elaborated by Samuelsson (2016) do not think of language as 
ideological in this way. On the other hand, the critique of delibera-
tive discussion takes language as ideological (just as Ruitenberg’s 
Mouffian critique of citizenship takes democracy as agonistic), 
holding that unconscious drives, identities, and metanarratives are 
at work in classroom discussion.
Conclusion
The purpose of this response paper is make another paradigm of 
thinking available to readers interested in thinking about 
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classroom discussion and democracy. Samuelsson’s (2016) essay 
has provenance in the Rawlsian and Habermasian traditions of 
deliberative democracy, articulated by Guttman, Thompson, and 
Englund, which prioritize giving reasons, willingness to listen, and 
consensus as hallmarks of deliberative discussion in the classroom. 
This neat formulation is just one paradigm of thinking about what 
is at stake democratically during classroom discussion. Another 
paradigm, which I have called the critique of deliberative discus-
sion, offers a different perspective following Ruitenberg’s work on 
radical democratic citizenship. The critique of deliberative 
discussion highlights the unconscious and emotional lives of 
participants in discussion, how drives and desires can influence the 
democratic quality of interaction while giving of reasons. The 
critique names the tensions among identities in discussion, 
specifically the way race, class, and gender undermine participants’ 
willingness to listen to one another during discussion. Finally, the 
critique of deliberative discussion understands consensus in the 
context of a general agonistics over the rules of language games, 
acknowledging how metanarratives set the table for discussion, 
guiding what counts as a legitimate and sensible statement during 
classroom discussion. In general, the critique of deliberative 
discussion holds that language is ideological and that therefore 
classroom discussion is enmeshed in political struggle. Techniques 
and practices such as the Harkness pedagogy, check- ins, progres-
sive stack, and collective questioning can help teachers practice  
the critical paradigm. The techniques help us walk the walk that the 
critique of deliberative discussion recommends. Speaking from my 
own experience as a teacher, these techniques can create a tangibly 
different kind of democracy in the classroom. When teaching with 
the critique of deliberative discussion, democracy becomes a 
radically participatory activity engaging students’ desires, struggles 
with identity, and focuses on dissensus and disrupting problematic 
consensus in society rather. Democracy in this paradigm is a 
demos, and the critique of deliberative democracy makes space for 
this demos in classroom discussion.
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